Likewise, Nigeria was also warned by him and FIFA, after the country’s president, Goodluck Jonathan, indicated that their national soccer team would be banned from international soccer games for two years, following their poor showing in South Africa and corruption allegations.  Blatter and FIFA quickly sprung to action to counter such possible suspension by the Nigerian authorities (and FIFA ignored the corruption allegations). Blatter went public and confidently told a press conference that FIFA had already taken “all necessary steps”.

The Nigerian authorities quickly retracted their ban threat, since Blatter and FIFA had threatened a retaliatory ban threat of their own, which would have also left out from international competition their under-20 women squad as well as their football clubs competing in Africa…

It is a matter of debate and controversy as to whether Blatter and FIFA ought to have such vast powers over soccer matters within a country.  Domestic political interference in sports can have a number of negative manifestations and consequences, and thus excesses ought to be kept in check.  Yet it is time that we accept that sports like soccer transcend the narrow realm of sports, and do have major political and economic ramifications. The notion of apolitical soccer is an oxymoron. Furthermore, even if FIFA’s intervention at times may be salutary when reverses and egregiously political decision, such interventions do constitute a challenge to the sovereignty of countries.  Thus, the issue is not so clear cut, with pros and cons.

What ought not be a matter for debate is that resolute action needs to be taken when corruption may be involved.  FIFA does not have a satisfactory track record on this issue, and in the case of Nigeria that was not a concern for FIFA, even though it may have been a concern among some in the top leadership of the country. Blatter and FIFA appeared to be merely interested in protecting their own turf and interests.

But even less of a debate ought to take place regarding FIFA ensuring that their policies are not subject to egregious double standards.  Even if one were to accept that there may be benefits from FIFA’s power to suspend countries from international soccer when domestic political interference in soccer takes place, there has to be a level playing field.

Blatter and FIFA were quick to publicly condemn the interference in France and in Nigeria (and in the past it suspended Greece, and came close to do so with Portugal and Poland, for instance).  But at least so far the silence by Blatter is deafening regarding the blatant abuses that the North Korean government is subjecting its national soccer coach and players (here for details).  There are already serious questions about the safety of the coach, who has been sent to a construction site, after being expelled from the Party and excoriated and demoted in public in a most humiliating manner (as well as the soccer players, who were forced into very public Stalinist ‘confessions’ to incriminate the coach).   This is an extension of the well known human rights abuse practices of this totalitarian regime, where in the past some athletes were sent to prison camps.  North Korea is the worst governed country in the world, period (even if there are a handful which are close, see here).

It should be a no brainer that if FIFA came close to suspending Nigeria and France (and it actually suspended Greece in the past), it ought to summarily suspend North Korea, a few times over.  Yet not even a public statement of concern has emerged from Blatter of other high FIFA officials yet, let alone decisive action (apparently FIFA is still quietly studying the situation).  Such delays and silence makes one wonder whether FIFA is much more reticent to act when it involves human right abuses on its soccer players and coaches by a totalitarian regime than when there is political debate in a democracy where FIFA has vast commercial interests and/or their political power is at stake.  Whatever the reason for such double standard, it is has no justification, and FIFA ought to act resolutely now, without further delays or excuses.

At a broader level, the ongoing North Korean saga puts a spotlight on the serious problems and dangers of professional sports in totalitarian countries.  More attention is required in their national sports system and how it affects the lives led by talented athletes from a very ripe age, which often constitute an extreme case of politicization of sports and its athletes.  And much more emphasis needs to be given to how to better protect these athletes from abuse (or worse) when they do not perform up to the expectations of their Supreme Leaders, as it has just taken place in North Korea, and also takes place in other authoritarian states.

International sports organizations such as the IOC and FIFA ought to be have much stricter standards regarding flagrant political abuses in countries like North Korea (and a dozen others) than whether a vibrant democracy like France has a political debate or not over the performance of its national team.  To take a tough stance on North Korea and a handful of other totalitarian states where athletes are subject to abuse would be an opportunity for FIFA now, since it may start the process of reversing its tarnished image on this and other governance dimensions.

There is growing consensus that unless the pace of progress quickens, the world will be unable to achieve the majority of the Millennium Development Goals in five years.  But the devil is in the details:  does the pace of progress need to quicken everywhere, and similarly across all MDGs?  And what does progress depend on?…

Last week the Belgian agency for Development Cooperation convened its 2010 “States General” Conference, which focused on the MDGs.  In the keynote address at the Conference I emphasized the achievements and challenges in meeting targets, and focused on governance as a constraint to accelerated progress.

The key issues I focused on in the Conference presentation are summarized below.*

First, where do we stand on the MDGs?   On average the world has made progress in meeting targets, but such progress has been very uneven.

Some countries and regions are succeeding, while others are stagnating. On balance, the world as a whole appears to be currently on track to halve absolute poverty by 2015.  However, such average progress is in large measure due to dramatic poverty reduction in China.

In 1990, over half of the population in East Asia, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa lived in extreme poverty.  In recent times, only 17 percent, or 22 percent if China were excluded, of the East Asian population  lives on less than $1.25 a day.

But, in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia 51 percent and 40 percent of the population (respectively) still lived below the $1.25 a day poverty line recently (Figure 1).   Even more striking, even though there are always debates about the accuracy of these figures (and there is a lag in reporting), over 70 percent of the population in the two regions appear to still live on under $2 a day.

While the world’s progress on average, largely driven by a few countries, is certainly laudable, 1.4 billion people continued to live on under $1.25 a day and 2.6 billion lived on under $2 a day in recent times.  Even in East Asia, where the largest reduction in extreme poverty has been achieved, 337 million live below the $1.25 poverty line.

Achievement is within reach on some MDGs, but is out of reach on others. In addition to being on track to halve poverty, the world (but not necessarily all regions) is on track to achieve gender equality in primary education and to halve the number of people living without access to clean water.

On other goals the world has made less progress. For instance, maternal mortality ratios were expected to be reduced by three-quarters, from 480 deaths per 100,000 live births to one hundred and twenty by 2015. By 2005, the maternal mortality remained nearly constant at 450 deaths. Similarly, the share of the population without access to sanitation was expected to be 28 percent, but by 2005 virtually half of the population remained without access (Table 1).

In the years since data on most indicators was last collected the world experienced a surge in food prices and a global economic recession. Both circumstances have negatively affected progress on MDGs.  The rise in food prices is estimated to have increased the number of chronically hungry people by 75 million to a worldwide total of nearly one billion, while the recession has contributed to the impoverishment of tens of more millions.

Considering that progress on MDGs has been uneven across regions and targets, and also the quality of governance is highly variable across countries, it is important to focus on the links between governance and the MDGs.  This is also warranted because governance has not received its due  attention in the programs to support and monitor progress of the MDGs.

Governance does matter for MDGs. Our past research suggests that when governance improves, from, say, the extremely low levels of a country like Afghanistan for instance, to the subpar (yet not bottom ranked) levels of Kenya (or from the subpar levels of Kenya to the many countries in the middle group of the worldwide governance indicators, such as India, or from the middling levels of India, to the satisfatory levels of Botswana), infant mortality on average declines by almost two-thirds, and incomes rise almost three-fold in the long run.  Subpar quality of governance in many countries can be a major constraint to progress on the MDGs (Figure 2).

Non-traditional dimensions of governance also affect the MDGs. Improvements in public sector financial management alone will not ensure good governance and progress on goals. Non-traditional (for many donors) aspects of governance, such as freedom of the press and human rights, also influence development. The strong relationship between poverty and gender rights is particularly striking.

Considering the slow progress on gender-related goals, much more attention ought to be paid to gender rights (Figure 3).  Research shows that female empowerment, education and income help reduce child and maternal mortality rates. Press freedom also impacts development (also in Figure 3, below).

Thus aid is necessary, but alone is far from sufficient. Research has shown that aid can be effective when there is satisfactory governance in the recipient country, or at least governance is steadily improving.  Studies have found that, among others, primary school enrollment and child mortality outcomes are also conditioned by governance. Thus, increasing aid will not ensure progress on the MDGs.  Investment in areas that impede the effective allocation and efficient use of funds, such as governance, may also make sense.

Governance is not only paramount for recipient countries, but it is also a key factor among the richer donor countries and their aid agencies.

Honoring Aid Commitments is Important. Meeting the MDGs is not only ambitious, it is also costly. Therefore in 2000, donors pledged to increase foreign aid to 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI). By 2008, donors provided only 0.3 percent of GNI on average, and only a fraction of this is channeled to the poorer countries.

The allocation of aid is also crucial. Providing governments with aid to increase health expenditure may improve child mortality rates, but only if the money is efficiently and transparently allocated.

Further, additional funds provided directly to MDG-related sectors, such as to cover health costs in urban settings, which many aid donors provide for,  may not always be as effective as providing some additional funding to neglected sectors, such as infrastructure or governance, which constrain progress for development in general, and for attaining those very health-related and other MDGs in particular.

In other instances communities may be more effective at implementing projects than central governments, particularly where high-level corruption is pervasive.   Under these circumstances donors should consider channeling aid to communities rather than central government agencies.  More generally, aid needs to be more selectively provided, so to enhance its effectiveness.

Development aid is not an island. The recent financial crisis has shone a spotlight on the impact of economic policies of industrialized countries on the rest of the world.  The recession has resulted in the impoverishment of millions more people in developing countries.  Responsible governance and policies in industrialized countries matter for development and the MDGs at least as much as donor aid itself.

Additionally, continued agricultural subsidies in industrialized countries continue to hamper the expansion of trade, employment and growth in many developing countries. These economic policies ought to be better integrated into development aid strategies by donors.  Further, greater attention should be paid to the important role of the private sector in meeting the MDGs.  Like governance and infrastructure, the role of the private sector has also been neglected in the MDGs.

In 2000, the international community committed itself to achieving eight lofty goals.  While the upcoming September UN Summit on the MDGs will surely highlight some of the partial successes in meeting the MDGs in some settings, there also ought to be an honest and transparent focus on the many setbacks in many settings around the world, and a frank assessment as to the reasons for such setbacks.

The evidence suggests that the uneven progress in MDGs is related to major differences in the quality of governance across nations.  Furthermore, there are dimensions of governance, such as gender rights and media freedoms, that may have been subject to particular neglect.  Yet more generally, as stated, in the recent past governance has not received the attention it deserves in the context of the MDGs.

Focus on governance by the international community is not the ‘politically correct’ thing to do, and, further, many leaders prefer to be mute about this challenge because they know that there is misgovernance in their midst.  Yet this merely helps to explain, not justify, inaction on this front.  In the next stage, emphasis on key governance dimensions, including corruption, inequality, media freedoms and gender rights, is required to help address major hurdles to progress.

Politically difficult decisions and decisive leadership are necessary, but by paying greater attention to governance, to improved aid selectivity and allocation, by targeting neglected sectors, and by supporting a larger role for the private sector, many MDGs may still be within reach for most.

……………………………………………………………………………………………….

*Note:  This entry is a synthesis of the presentation I gave last week at the Conference in Brussels referred to above.  An expanded version, co-written with Veronika Penciakova, has been subsequently posted here as a Commentary piece  at the Brookings website.   This blog entry draws from the joint piece.

On Wednesday, March 31, international donors are convening at the United Nations to discuss Haiti’s long-term reconstruction plans and to make assistance pledges.  The publicly disseminated Action Plan for Reconstruction and National Development of Haiti, produced by the government of Haiti with inputs from the U.N., European Commission, the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and civil society, has assessed Haiti’s reconstruction needs over the next three years at $11.5 billion.

The full Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), produced by a collaborative effort involving 300 Haitian and international experts weeks ago, and on which the Haitian government’s Action Plan is based, has yet to be fully disclosed to the public, although it is expected to be presented at the donor conference…

All this takes place exactly as another peaceful and democratic transfer of power is about to take place.  The epicenter is a mere 70 miles or so from the major coastal city of Valparaiso, the seat of Parliament, where the Presidents in Chile pass the baton.  President Michelle Bachelet leaves with 84% popularity, and President Sebastian Piñera takes the oath of office, with high expectations and enormous reconstruction and social challenges ahead.  He is the first democratically elected right-of-center President in the past 50 years in Chile.

Meanwhile, the peaceful proceedings of this transition in power continue apace, and exactly according to schedule, whether the earth is shaking or not.  Visiting heads of state and dignitaries, many of whom are not used to earthquakes, appear to be much more rattled (and pale) than local citizens and officials.

Notable people and institutions.

.

[*Postcript:  Late in the day of Thursday, March 11th, the original magnitude of the large tremor that took place minutes before the transfer of power was revised downwards from 7.2 to 6.9.  Either way, its strength rivaled the Haiti earthquake.  It was followed by 3 large aftershocks shortly thereafter.  Apparently one person died, of a heart attack. For a worldwide seismic monitor map, depicting a the strength of earhquakes, click here.  For a photo gallery on the Chile earthquakes, here]

[In Spanish / En Castellano, traducido mecanicamente por computadora, aqui]

It is also clear what the immediate emergency rescue and relief needs are, such as water, food and medical treatment, and then some shelter and emergency power.  While precious few days may have been lost at first, the international community is now rushing assistance to Haiti, and improved coordination efforts on the ground are beginning to show results.  And we know that in recent times international donors have generally had a decent track record recently in emergency relief efforts when disaster strikes…

What is much less clear is what needs to happen after the first emergency stage in Haiti, and what the response from the international community ought to be in the short-to-medium term.  Some pundits are providing recommendations brimming with certitude.  But it just may turn out to be more efficient to start from a position of humility and doubt, acknowledging a measure of collective ignorance as to what will work in Haiti in the medium term.  This is not based in the abstract: for many years, until the earthquake last week, the international community approach to development aid in Haiti was far from a success.   The blame is not merely due to insufficient aid funds (here for details), or the erratic and often military-driven foreign policy of the US in Haiti.  It is much more complicated than that, it relates to domestic factors as well, including leadership and governance.  Such simplistic views on funding and finger pointing at one foreign power betray a misunderstanding of the development process.

In a meaningful sense, Haiti had not yet become a developing country prior to the earthquake.  Granted, two weeks ago Haiti may not have been an extreme case of a ‘failed state’, in the way that Somalia has been for instance.  While very weak, Haiti did have a government of sorts, which had made some tentative inroads in some areas over the past decade (such as on ‘voice’).

But political correctness aside, Haiti had not yet joined the developing country set.  Public Sector as well as Rule of Law institutions were fledgling at best, and often dysfunctional at worst.   The two comparative charts below illustrate the enormous challenge that Haiti was facing prior to the devastating earthquake, for two governance dimensions, namely Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness.   Not shown here is the chart for Control of Corruption, which features a very similar pattern.

The evidence suggests that Haiti was placing barely a notch above the failed state of Somalia.  It was not far above it, or from Sudan, for instance.  Haiti’s ‘performance’ was well below developing countries in Central America, for instance, which have had to cope with their share of natural disasters.  The contrast between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which share the same island of Hispaniola, was also stark by the end of 2008.  Likewise, Haiti’s institutional performance was far below that one of Indonesia, which took the brunt of the tsunami.  Indonesian institutions, even if less than stellar (yet improving), played a key role in the relief and recovery effort post-tsunami.  That is unlikely to be the case in Haiti.  While Haitians should take the initiative as much as possible in leading their own recovery and reconstruction effort, it is counterproductive to claim that very soon the international community ought to play a ’supportive role’, providing as much funds as possible to the government, and expecting it to deliver in taking the lead now.

Instead, the international community will need to be much more involved than usual, for a longer period, and in a more ‘hands-on’ fashion than warranted in developing countries — akin to a ravaged post-conflict situation.  This does not mean that one country (whether the US or France) or one institution (whether the UN or one multilateral development bank) should take full control of the effort, either.  This would be a bad idea.  First, because the enormous challenges ahead are vast and in different areas (ranging from security, emergency relief and infrastructure, to development), and there is not a single country or institution that could do it well across the spectrum.  Each country and institution has a comparative advantage, and the needs are dire.  Second, the track record by many international donors in Haiti is spotty, and thus there is uncertainty as to which country or institution will perform.  Some division of labor , as well as a modicum of competition may work out better than a foreign monopoly in the aid effort.  Third, given history and culture in Haiti, it may backfire for a country like the US to take over.

And the last (but not least) reason: while I argue that we need to be realistic regarding how much can be expected from the Haitian central government in the near future, the same is not the case at the community level in Haiti.  Even in terms of ensuring an orderly and efficient distribution of emergency relief right now, it would be well advised to collaborate much more closely at the community level (and its leaders) within Haiti.

In fact, after the urgent relief effort and coping with the challenges of exodus, migration and maintaining order, as a medium term aim there an opportunity to help build Haitian institutions so that the country jumps aboard a sustained development path.   Currently we see that the media is concerned about the looting and violence that is taking place in the capital.  Less known is the fact that there was frequent looting and violence well before the earthquake, a symptom of dysfunctional institutions.

Consequently, complementing the massive needs for food and infrastructure, the medium term approach to aid in Haiti needs to invest significantly in governance institutions, in some cases essentially starting from scratch.  There is not a one and only ‘right way’ of doing this, and by one anointed international or government agency.  This massive effort will take an number of key players — governmental and non-governmental– from the outside and from within the country.  New technologies (including satellite) ought to play a major role in helping coordinate efforts, mitigating the traditional rationale that there should be one single coordinating agency in control.

Further, we should be realistic about the void in Haiti’s central government in the short term, but entrust its people and communities with major responsibility in the process that will ensue for years to come.  Finally, we should be draw the lessons from the mistakes in past development aid programs, ensure that donors ensure that projects and funds are carried out with decent governance standards, and that uncertainty is factored into the design and implementation of development strategies and projects.

According to a TSA senior official, the list of 14 countries was developed by the Homeland Security and State Departments, and include countries the US Government designated as ’state sponsors of terrorism’, namely Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria, as well as 10 ‘countries of interest’: Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Yemen…

Arguments about the morality and constitutionality of these new requirements are being voiced. While important, these tend to mask the urgent and practical “effectiveness” question: Will screening travelers from a list of 14 nations make travel safer.

First, let us briefly “profile” the countries on this new TSA list based on their performance in the relevant dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) that we produce annually.

On the governance indicator measuring political instability and major violence/terror, the 2008 data show that seven countries on the TSA’s list, namely Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia and Sudan are among the very bottom of the 210 countries analyzed. These seven countries also score poorly in most every other governance dimension, including voice and democratic accountability, control of corruption and rule of law. In addition to this “profile” being consistent with that of failed states, it also shows the extent of challenges faced by Yemen in recent years, suggesting that the sudden U.S. and international attention on the country is long overdue.

The governance realities among the rest of the countries on the TSA list are more nuanced. While they face enormous challenges, it would be a misnomer to characterize them as failed or quasi-failed states. In terms of political instability and major violence, Iran for instance does not place at the bottom among countries in the world, although it has experienced a major deterioration throughout the decade. Similarly, while Lebanon rated better than 50 other countries in the world in 2000, by 2008 it had joined the ranks of the bottom 10 in terms of political instability and major violence.

The “middling” ratings that the WGI confers to Libya and Saudi Arabia for political stability (as well as the “mediocre” scores for Syria) suggest that these countries manage to maintain a semblance of political stability, but at the expense of voice and democratic accountability. Notably, even with a modicum of political stability, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria have been unable to control terrorism, and in some instances tolerated or even sponsored it.

On the other hand, the outlier on this TSA list is Cuba, which may have been included for politically expedient and historical reasons, rather than due to current evidence about their governance performance in general or of specific terrorist threats in particular. Cuba, while performing satisfactorily on political stability and absence of violence, scores very low on voice and democratic accountability. Yet such dimension on its own is not an effective predictor—countries like China, which have low ratings, were not included. Furthermore, countries like Russia are also not in the list, with low ratings on democratic accountability and despite of its checkered history related to (internal) terrorism, which has doomed passenger airplanes and trains.

Based on the governance profile of the TSA’s 14 country list, it thus appears that multiple (and shifting) considerations were applied to decide on inclusion (and exclusion). A few countries appear to be there because they sponsor or tolerate terrorism, others are very weak states exhibiting an unstable environment in which terrorist operations may thrive, and others may have been included for historical and political reasons. The main question still remains: will targeting these 14 countries for profiling their citizens while traveling make our skies safer?

While it is true that the numbers of would-be terrorists residing in failing or sponsoring states are likely to be higher than in other countries, most countries in the world have potential terrorists in their midst. Consider for instance names such as Padilla, McVeigh, Reid, Lindsay, Gadahn, Lindh, to mention a few of OECD origin. Thus, targeting a list of only 14 countries will be ineffective and inefficient, since many potential terrorists will be missed and although all travelers from these countries will be screened, only a tiny portion of them will actually pose a terrorist threat.

Instead of focusing on nationality as a profiling devise for travel screening, a different and multi-pronged strategy may prove more effective. It would entail shifting away from national identity (and obsession with toothpaste…) toward a focus on the individual traveler—reviewing their passports and visas, observing their behavior, and making effective use of a well-integrated background database of individuals of concern.

First, it is both more cost-effective and efficient to study a person’s passport, with the wealth of information it provides than to engage in coarse nationality-based screening. Second, telltale signs from passenger behavior provide important information to the trained (and electronic) eye, as we have learned from the Israelis.

Third, we should use the existing database resources more effectively: all required information about Umar Abdul Mutallab was available, including a damning official report from his own father. As President Obama stated aptly: “This was not a failure to collect intelligence, it was a failure to integrate and understand the intelligence that we already had… Our intelligence community failed to connect those dots.” Had they been connected, Mutallab would not have boarded the flight, and no nationality profiling would have been necessary.

Fourth, in addition to using the above people-based strategies, it makes sense to also continue random screenings. This is because terrorist groups strive to learn to beat any preset system. In fact, it is for this reason that nationality-based profiling is likely to be less effective than exclusively relying on random screening.

Finally, instead of compiling a list to assist in the profiling of foreign nationals, a list of countries that pose medium-term terrorist threats due to current levels underdevelopment and poor governance does make eminent sense. Those countries should be pro-actively engaged in a medium-term strategy to support improved governance, development, and state-building, which would also help deter terrorism.  Even if some overlap took place, the composition of such a “governance and development-oriented” list would differ from the list of 14 that the TSA has compiled for profiling.

[Note: this entry, with the exception of the cartoon and picture (added here for color), originally appeared as a web editorial at Brookings, here].

Instead, Anderson went on to perform an historic concert on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, attended by 75,000 people.   She was also invited to sing in the White House.  Eventually, the DAR changed its racist policy, and many years later Marian Anderson sang at the Constitution Hall.

As Marian Anderson and other African-American singers became more prominent (in Europe as well, where Marian faced less discrimination), it became increasingly difficult for the Metropolitan Opera to keep black singers off their their august stage was awkward.  And the founding of the New York City Opera in the mid-40s, which had a fresh mandate to employ African-American, applied competitive pressure on the Met.

So fifty five years ago, on January 7th, 1955, Marian Anderson became the first African-American singer to perform at the Met.  For her it was the first time she sang in a full opera.  She sang Ulrica in Verdi’s Un Ballo in Maschera  (A Masked Ball).  While it is not the protagonist role, Ulrica is one of the key characters in that opera and features beautiful and challenging music.  She was paid the highest fee by the Met at the time, namely US $1,000 per performance.  Tickets for her Met debut were sold out right after they went on sale.

The press came from as far away as the West Indies to witness history in the making, and the audience included Eleanor Roosevelt, Margaret Truman, and the Duchess of Windsor.  She was already 57 years old when she first performed opera at the Met.  Her performance brought down the house.   The greatest music conductor of his generation, Arturo Toscanini, had commented that hers was a voice that “comes once in a century”.

Art and civil rights often intersect in history.  Other stories abound.  In this blog space, for instance, I have written about Verdi’s commitment to human rights (and him being a blogger of sorts…).

As 2009 comes to an end, I felt it was important to write about this, even if with a soft voice relating it to opera as New Year is upon us.  It was difficult, however, to end the year looking the other way in terms of what still transpires nowadays in terms of human rights violations.  Events that have recently taken place in Iran, China, Russia and Guinea, just to name a few, are powerful reminders that as we enter yet another decade in the 21st century, human rights challenges are still so vast.

In fact, the evidence in our hands suggests little progress on average around the world on civil liberties, press freedoms and human rights over the past decade.  To the contrary, many countries have seen a deterioration, while others have stagnated on this front.  Let us strive to a better new decade ahead.

Or worse…

To place this special Anti-Corruption Day in poignant perspective today, as the decade draws to a close, consider that over six years ago, in late 2003, the UN General Assembly designated December 9th as International Anti-Corruption Day.  It was intended to further the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and encourage countries to sign and ratify it, so to ensure its swift entry into force.   The UNCAC was touted by the UN as ‘the first legally binding, international anti-corruption instrument that provides a chance to mount a global response to corruption.’

What happened since then?   Countries signed.  Countries ratified.  Plenty of process work by secretariats.  And a very large contingent of government officials and others just gathered in Doha in mid-November, in order to reach closure on six years of work regarding implementing the review mechanism for country progress on anti-corruption.   But an important group of governments present in Doha, including China, Russia, Egypt, Pakistan and Zimbabwe, were against agreement of serious commitment to such implementation.

The resulting review mechanism for UNCAC is toothless.   It gives governments discretion in denying inclusion of civil society in reviewing progress, it introduces voluntarism into monitoring progress (rather than mandating it), and it allows governments to be non-transparent and withhold full publication of country reports.  Further, they somehow managed to create what is already by design a very ineffective and bloated implementation review group, which incidentally will not even be allowed to review country reports.  And they failed to advance on key pending challenges on asset recovery.

All this conspires against the objective of governments fulfilling their obligations under the UNCAC.

Thus, in the immediate aftermath of such UNCAC setback, today, as we face the (UNCAC-inspired) International Anti-Corruption Day, it may be appropriate to have an hour of silence instead, in order to pause and reflect where we are today, and where we need to go instead.  Let us reflect, and try to reboot.

Any such reflection needs to take a broader view, beyond the UNCAC (and the UN), and would need to consider the world’s changed geopolitics today, the lessons and aftermath of the financial crisis, and would also have to consider that one does not fight corruption by merely fighting corruption.   Leadership, institutions and governance need to be brought to the fore.

In fact, taking the broader path, it was exactly a year ago that on International Anti-Corruption Day 2008 I was asked to give a farewell address at the World Bank, as I was leaving after decades there, to join the Brookings Institution.  I was reviewing some slides from that presentation and find that its essence still applies today (it is here).

At the time, after recounting some of my earlier experiences working on development, I spent some time on unorthodox notions such as ‘Legal Corruption’ as well as the State and Regulatory Capture of the US financial system and the havoc that it was causing around the world.  I also addressed the problematic approach that the aid donor community has had to furthering good governance and corruption control when working with developing countries.   If anything, some of those problems have become even more serious over the past year, as I have written in this space and elsewhere in recent months.

Fortunately, there are a some far sighted leaders and reformists in some countries who recognize that the global financial crisis was not only a challenge, but also an opportunity for implementing reforms that otherwise may have been politically difficult to carry out.  Those countries will emerge stronger from the crisis, with better prospects in the medium term than the many that used the crisis as an excuse to postpone reforms.  Further divergence among countries, not convergence, will take place, driven by starkly different quality of leadership and governance.

Transparency International (TI), the international anti-corruption NGO, just released its annual corruption perceptions index (CPI).  No big surprises. This is no surprise.  Corruption does not tend to change dramatically from one year to the next.  Yet it is certainly worth reviewing the new data…

Before so doing, a warning:  governance indices (including those we are associated with) are not highly accurate.  Therefore, precise rankings are misleading. There is a need to be transparent and precise about the extent of imprecision in each index, as well as the implications of such imprecision for comparisons across countries and over time…

When differences between two countries are large (or the change for the same country over an 8-year period is substantial), and such change is informed by many independent sources, one can have confidence that those differences are meaningful.  Small differences in ranks or ratings imply that the two countries being compared are in a ’statistical tie’.  Yet there is such large variation in anti-corruption performance across countries, that there are many comparisons that can be made with high confidence — without pretending precision in rankings.

New Zealand, Denmark, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland and Finland are at the top.  Comparisons among themselves, or trying to ‘anoint a ‘No. 1′ would be silly hair-splitting.  Yet one can suggest that any country in that top group does perform better than the US or France, for instance, both of which cannot be meaningfully distinguished from each other (or from Chile, for that matter…).

On the other end of the spectrum one finds well over a dozen countries regarded by the TI index as rife with corruption, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Chad, Somalia, Myanmar (Burma), Equatorial Guinea, Venezuela, Haiti, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  Conflict is rife in some, authoritarianism and extractive industries in others.

Focusing on the group of countries that are performing very poorly on corruption, which include other dozens in addition to those listed above as well, may spur further debate about aid effectiveness.  This could be healthy.  In fact, right now in the US there are now at least three major efforts underway to review that country’s official foreign aid strategy and programs, one from the White House, another from the State Department, and yet another in the US Congress.  Indicators are key to evidence-driven policy making.

Looking at the indices on corruption, it is simple to see that countries where the US has channeled large amounts of development aid, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan and Pakistan, and to a large extent Nigeria, Egypt and Kenya, are not faring well on corruption.

It would be equally simple to rationalize pulling back from development aid.  That would be simplistic and misguided, for the US, or for other bilateral or multilateral donor agency.   Yet business as usual in development aid is not an option.  [Actually, I stand corrected; continuing old practices of funneling funds seems to be the only 'option' being on the table in some aid agencies nowadays...]

It is critical to probe below the surface and ask tough questions, like these ones for starters:

1.  Even if there are high levels of corruption in the country when the US (or other donors) provide massive aid, is there evidence that improvements are taking place, and that there is a reformist leadership (not just in central government) committed to future changes — so that there is a likelihood of sustained movement in the right direction?   In other words, let us not focus on mere levels of corruption, even if dire.

2.  Aren’t there some cases of significant aid flowing to countries where there is no endemic corruption, and what can one learn from these?   The focus on the Iraqs, Afghanistans and Pakistans can blindside one to the fact that there different country cases as well.  Colombia has been a large recipient of development aid, and over the past decade there have been notable improvements in controlling corruption.  Then in Ethiopia corruption is not endemic, another relatively large aid recipient.  Of course both countries feature other challenges (to different degrees), such as in the democratic accountability and human rights front.  Liberia, through resolute leadership, provides another potentially interesting case study in improvement in the short term.

3.  Are the programs  funds being provided by the aid program actually helping promote improved governance and anti-corruption in meaningful way, with full country leadership and partnership?  Or are they perpetuating corrupt governments, leaders and institutions?  Or are they simply being wasted and not making a difference (while they could be making a big difference somewhere else)?

4.  Where the public leadership and central government is entrenched and highly corrupt, what alternatives to working with central governments can be deepened?  What has worked, and what has not?

5.  What is the exposure to corruption in the very projects and funds provided by development aid?   [This is a well known concern, and a relevant one, although often concentrating solely on this fiduciary issue has meant ignoring the all-important development effectiveness concern in the previous four sets of questions].

Needless to say, corruption cannot be the only lens by which aid effectiveness needs to assessed.  It is often a symptom of broader governance failures. Nonetheless, a likely conclusion from a serious review of development effectiveness if governance and corruption are taken head on would be that further selectivity in aid programs may be needed.  Yet the devil will be in the details.  And in the polity.

Further consistency in applying criteria for helping countries is also sorely needed, even if imperfectly.  The treatment of similarly corrupt governments by official donor agencies tends to be very different depending on geo-oil-politics, undermining credibility and impact.  This is just for starters, and was also part of an interesting exchange today with a journalist of Sphere/AOL News, here.   And this story in today’s NYT on the politics of corruption between the US and Equatorial Guinea is very telling.

Plenty of work ahead.

]]> http://thekaufmannpost.net/corruption-index-today-development-aid-reform-tomorrow/feed/ 3 http://thekaufmannpost.net/g-20-global-governance-better-than-their-national-governance/ http://thekaufmannpost.net/g-20-global-governance-better-than-their-national-governance/#comments Mon, 12 Oct 2009 03:01:06 +0000 Kaufmann http://thekaufmannpost.net/?p=1378 Thanks for bearing with me during my recent blogging absence.  I am now back, and posted this entry after the Pittsburgh G-20 Summit in the newly unveiled blog at Brookings, where I work.

The G-20 had just finished their third meeting, and there was a lot of buzz surrounding the demise of the G8 and it being replaced by the broader G-20.  Accolades were also given to this Pittsburgh Summit on the progress of IMF and World Bank governance reforms and on climate change.  But, I argued against the irrational exuberance by some pundits.  Uncorking of the champagne would have been premature…

For starters, during the G-20 London Summit last April, it was already obvious that the G-8 was effectively displaced.  While the G-20 was grappling with the gravest phase of the financial crisis, the Italian prime minister announced that he would host the forthcoming G8 summit in a ship. Thus, Pittsburgh may have merely formalized what long ago was already inevitable, given the changed geopolitical and economic reality.

While broadening the “voice”of emerging economies in these elite clubs is obviously welcomed, there is less than meets the eye. First, let us keep in mind that while more “voice” is being given, some of those very governments are not particularly adept at giving “voice” to their own people. It is still an elite club of governments, representing 19 countries and the EU.

Aabout 1.5 billion citizens living in three of these countries are severely “voice deprived,” while another 400 million living in another three countries have it only a tad better, living in a “voice challenged” environment. This “people-friendly voice” (and not merely government-focused) perspective is also important in looking at the “voice reforms” at the IMF and the World Bank. So far, these reforms are marginal, and again, focused on government representation. Many of these governments are not necessarily fully representative of their own people. Other country governments, such as Belgium, are representative of their citizenry, but are tiny, and yet are holding on to their executive chairs in these organizations.

Further, a larger group may enhance voice and participation, but important decision-making is unlikely. The Pittsburgh communiqué is illustrative with “encouragements,”exhortations and principles, and even a bit of “peer review.” But there are no sanctions or other clear incentives or enforcement mechanisms to engage in concrete collective action for the public global good.

Witness for instance the bit on trade in the communiqué. It is last, an afterthought, and simply reiterating what was already exhorted in the London Summit in April, including the customary “commitment to Doha.” In reality, the world continues to move further into protectionism. U.S. duties on Chinese tires illustrate just this. Likewise, the outcome of the G-20 meeting is rather weak on the expected revamp of financial regulations. Granted, there was so much focus on compensation reform. But this is neither the crux of the matter, nor best resolved by 20 governments.

To give credit where it is due, the London Summit did further convergence among key players toward the need for stimulus plans in their economies. But this is an exception, which was forced by the dire magnitude of the crisis. And during Pittsburgh, an emerging consensus to phase out inefficient energy subsidies may turn out to be a non-trivial achievement as well. And there was again a long list of calls to help the vulnerable and poor. While laudable, they were mostly exhortations for voluntarism, again.

Finally, consider a very different “Group-of-8:” Botswana, Chile, Mauritius, Uruguay, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland. Do they have any relevance for the G-20? Little, at first. None of them were invited to the previously G-20 summits since neither their economic size nor their population are large enough, and they lack the global “systemic significance” of most G-20 members. This particular “Group-of-8” does not even really exist as a formal body.

But there is a rationale for G-20 leaders to pay attention to this particular set of uninvited countries. Like the G-20, they comprise a rather diverse group of developing and developed countries from different regions of the world. But, unlike most of the G-20, this particular group of eight countries exhibits high quality of national governance. In fact, their levels of governance, on average, exceed the now defunct G8.  This good governance group is not perfect either, but their experiences and lessons ought not be ignored. In a recent article, I emphasized the need to look for good practices outside of the G-20.

We need to keep in mind that it is rare for any organization to be better than the sum of its parts. Too often we assess global governance institutions without first having a serious look at the governance (and set of incentives) of each individual country member—in this case governments.

The Pittsburgh Summit was very weak on national governance and integrity issues, even though they are critical to solving other global challenges.  Perhaps the G-20 may focus better on governance when it next meets in Seoul, while also humbly drawing from important lessons from countries and experiences outside the G-20.