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Natural Disasters, National Diligence: The Chilean Earthquake in Perspective
By Kaufmann | March 6, 2010 7 Comments »
The Chilean earthquake that hit during the early morning hours of February 27 has brought searing images of devastation; and international news coverage has shown scenes of looting and arson incidents occurring in its immediate aftermath. In Chile, criticism of the government’s response is widespread.
Many are wondering whether numerous deaths and severe destruction could have been prevented; whether the government’s emergency response and rescue to this natural disaster was speedy and effective; and why law and order broke down in the earthquake’s aftermath.
Criticism has focused on the failure by the central authorities to alert coastal populations of the impending tsunami, its delayed and timid reaction to unrest in the most devastated region in the south (where most of the looting has taken place), and its slow initial distribution of essential supplies.
By providing a comparative perspective that considers both the magnitude of the natural disaster and Chile’s governance characteristics, we suggest that in spite of some important mistakes Chile has thus far fared relatively well. We identify selected shortcomings, which present an opportunity for further reform and progress in Chile.
Natural Disasters and the Death Toll
As of March 5, the Chilean government had confirmed 279 identified victims, although the death toll is likely to increase by the hundreds considering many have not yet been identified or are deemed missing. Yet the death toll is highly unlikely to reach thousands. Nonetheless, the tragic death of hundreds of people is enormously saddening and brings grief to many others.
Yet, the Chilean earthquake was the fifth strongest quake for over a hundred years, measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale. This propels it to the nefarious elite “mega-earthquake” league, which means that it was hundreds of times stronger than other earthquakes near populated areas in recent years, with the exception of the 2004/5 Indonesian earthquakes. [Global Seismic Monitoring here]
Fresh in our minds are the images of recent disaster in Haiti, with an earthquake magnitude of 7.0 and a death toll of over 220,000 people. More distant are the memories of earthquakes in Pakistan in 2005 (magnitude of 7.6; 86,000 dead), Mexico in 1985 (8.0; 9,500), Japan in 1995 (6.9, 5,502), Armenia in 1988 (6.8; 25,000), Turkey in 1999 (7.6; 17,118), or more recently the infamous earthquake in China in 2008, (7.9; 87,587), among many others. The death toll in these cases far surpasses that of Chile, as seen in the Table at the bottom of this article.
The real question then is why the death toll in Chile is not vastly larger. Chile’s mega-earthquake was relatively deep, which may have partially mitigated its monstrous force at the surface. Not only did the earth shake for a long time, but the earthquake’s epicenter was also very close to several highly populated centers.
As a result, a vast area was affected—from the south where Chile’s second largest city, Concepción, lays very near the epicenter, to Santiago at the country’s center and further north. And additionally, not only did the earthquake cause massive surface destruction, it also triggered a tsunami and numerous and severe aftershocks (often exceeding a magnitude of 6).
It may be of little consolation for those in Chile, but when a natural disaster of this magnitude hits, the number of expected deaths would have been vastly higher in most other countries.
Earthquake’s Impact: Governance Matters
Chile’s good governance played a significant role in limiting the death toll resulting from this earthquake. In particular, two dimensions of governance stand out—government effectiveness (the efficacy of the public sector), and control of corruption. Over the years, Chile’s effective institutions succeeded in designing and adopting better building codes, which have been periodically upgraded, to take into account previous earthquake experience, innovations in preventative technologies and the country’s growing wealth (made possible in part by good governance).
Equally noteworthy is that these building codes are enforced. The media has brought to international public knowledge a new high-rise that has collapsed in Concepción and an apartment building near Santiago that has been rendered inhabitable since it is leaning more than the Tower of Pisa.
Notably though, these examples indicate that non-compliance with building codes (and possibly corruption) is likely individualized, rather than systemic. Naturally, there are many damaged structures, particularly (but not exclusively) those built long ago. Even though there are many people close to the epicenter who are now homeless, the overall stock of houses was not decimated and the number of fatalities due to buildings collapsing was limited. In fact, a very large portion of deaths resulted from the tsunami instead.
Undoubtedly, as with past earthquakes, lessons will be drawn from damage assessments and building codes will be improved; but overall the existing system did work. In contrast with the devastating effects that corruption in the construction sector had on the cities affected by the earthquakes in Turkey (where many new residential buildings collapsed) and China (where many schools full of pupils collapsed), the low levels of corruption in Chile, coupled with effective institutions, help explain why building codes were largely enforced.
More broadly, empirical evidence, such as that presented by an academic article by Mathew Kahn on natural disasters, suggests that among other factors, governance and corruption control are determinants of the death tolls. A review of recent earthquakes, as shown in the more detailed Table at the bottom of the article, and of the quality of governance (in terms of governance effectiveness and control of corruption) is also suggestive, as depicted in this Chart here, exhibiting two of the WGI’s Governance Indicators for some countries.
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Government’s Response: Pitfalls and the “Governance Test”
Advance planning for earthquakes, including training drills, is an integral part of adult and child education in Chile. In terms of immediate crisis response, however, serious mistakes occurred.
First, the tsunami alert was mishandled apparently by a responsible unit in the Navy, which failed to coordinate with the national emergency office. Even if the tsunami threat would have been identified in a timely fashion by the responsible authorities (which it was not), it is unlikely that the information would have been relayed in time to the affected localities. This is because the warning system relied on the internet and telephony, both of which were disabled during the power grid failure.
Second, the government was initially slow in dispersing essential supplies to the most afflicted cities in the south, partly due to its inability to assess local needs as a result of the power failure.
Third, the government hesitated and delayed the deployment of the army to assist in the relief effort and to maintain law and order—partly as a result of narrow political calculations and latent sensitivity to the use of armed force given the memories of the Pinochet regime. Looting and arson did take place in some localities, while the press widely reported those incidents that did occur.
After these initial delays in the first few days, the central government, armed with better organization, more information and increased decisiveness has streamed help into affected areas, providing emergency supplies and restoring law and order.
The mistakes made, while not trivial, need also to be put into perspective. Perfection is wholly unrealistic in any crisis situation of this magnitude and complexity, where thousands of critical decisions and steps need to be taken in a coordinated fashion by many officials in disparate locations and in a very short period of time.
For instance, more serious blunders occurred during the U.S. response to 2005 Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Over 1,800 people died and tens of thousands were perilously stranded in their flooded homes, stadiums and convention centers for days. Looting, violence and disorder erupted and lasted nearly a week until 40,000 troops arrived belatedly to restore law and order. Today the city has only about two-thirds its pre-Katrina population.
This serious string of mishaps took place in a country with a generally effective government. Serious mistakes were made regarding the evaluation and maintenance of the old levees, the evacuation of citizens, availability of sufficient stocks of supplies before the hurricane, and in the coordination of rescue and recovery efforts in its aftermath.
As we observe in the chart, the U.S. also exhibits high levels of control of corruption; although within U.S. cities, New Orleans has not historically been known for excelling in probity. A corollary of this comparison between Chile and the U.S. is that a serious mistake by the government in times of a sudden crisis brought by a natural disaster is not a symptom of underdevelopment. Neither is the eruption of riots.
The real “governance test” is the ability and flexibility of a country’s institutions to address and contain crisis, which does include learning and acting quickly to address and correct mistakes.
In the ongoing rescue and relief operation in Chile, it is obviously too early to have a definitive assessment, but the evidence is already encouraging, and consistent with good governance: while building on its strengths, the government has already acknowledged mistakes made and has been moving decisively to correct them. As a result, some modicum of calm is being restored as relief efforts are broadened and order is restored.
Another crucial component of the “governance test” is the local-level response. The heroic efforts by many local government officials, community leaders and villagers often do not entice the TV cameras the same way that a building ablaze, a looted store, or a collapsed structure does.
Those good deeds may go largely untold and uncounted (as of yet), but they do play a key role in complementing, and at times, supplanting the central government’s efforts. A powerful example was the life-saving efforts by local officers in some coastal towns who blared evacuation instructions through bullhorns once the earthquake struck, supplanting the failed “sophisticated” tsunami alert from the center.
Some Governance Implications for Chile
Clearly right now the priority ought to be the continued expediting of the relief effort in a decisive, well-coordinated and targeted fashion. Yet, it is important to start planning for the reconstruction phase as well.
Relatively speaking, Chile will be well positioned for that challenge given its high level of governance. In sharp contrast to Haiti, it will not require a massive international aid effort (although it will require targeted technical and equipment support from other countries), nor will it require the inception of major new institutions (and particularly no foreign-driven institution will be needed).
And while the reconstruction funding needs will be very large, in many billions of dollars, Chile’s resilient economy and stellar macroeconomic discipline gives it substantial headroom to fund this reconstruction without excessive reliance on debt (or inflationary) financing. Further, the dynamic private sector is expected to play a pivotal role.
In the reconstruction effort, it will be important to apply the lessons learned and mistakes made during this earthquake, such as in improving the tsunami warning system, ensuring sufficient backup power and establishing emergency communication systems, and designating strategic locations for crucial human resources and supply stocks around the country.
Applying lessons regarding standards for some types of construction, such as in the reinforcement of older structures and hospitals, may be required as well. And Chile’s modern and transparent procurement system will now be put through a major test given the scope and urgency of the upcoming infrastructure investments that will be required. Yet measures will need to be in place, including particular monitoring from civil society, so to mitigate the risk of capture by powerful private firms, a risk whenever there is a surge in large lucrative contracts.
There are also broader challenges that will need to be addressed. Among institutions, the police and the army may need to be reformed and modernized. A move toward some modicum of decentralization and devolution of central authority ought to be considered in light of this experience.
And more generally, the looting and arson is a potent reminder of the potentially explosive socio-economic tensions inherent in an unequal society. In fact, among pre-earthquake governance challenges in Chile, consistently common crime would top the list, which in part is due to an insufficiently professionalized police force, and in part the result of socio-economic inequalities and under-employment among the poor. The massive investment and job creation effort that will be needed in Chile’s south may offer a unique opportunity to also tackle these pending challenges.
Indeed, a tragic natural disaster such as this can also become an opportunity for Chile to emerge even stronger and more equal. Leadership is, and will be, key.
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Note: This entry originates from a Brookings Op Ed Commentary article, written jointly with Jose Tessada, also at Brookings.
Este artículo esta en castellano (aquí). This article is also in spanish (here).
Topics: Aid Effectiveness, Corruption, Measurement Frontiers, Public Financial Management, Regulation & Security, Rule of Law, capture | | 7 Comments
March 6th, 2010 at 8:48 pm
The comment “and China (where many schools full of pupils collapsed)” is based upon the testimony of a Chinese man who crusaded as a government critic. He early claimed that 11,000 children had died in the quake and that the government was hiding the magnitude of the disaster. However, subsequent completion of the death and damage report showed that the government’s figures were quite accurate, and that the percentage of school-age children killed was proportionate to their representation in the population as a whole.
March 6th, 2010 at 10:57 pm
The earthquake in Sichuan, China, took place on May 12, 2008. One year later, the Science section report of of the New York Times on that earthquake provided substantial information regarding the vast extent of casualties among students due to the schools that collapsed, and indicated that even an official report admitted as much (even though they point out that the authorities were not transparent about the full extent of the casualties). Among others, the article states:
‘…Thousands of the initial quake’s victims were children crushed in shoddily built schools, inciting protests by parents. Local police harassed the protestors and the government criticized them. At least one human rights advocate who championed their cause was arrested. The Chinese government has refused to release the number of students who died or their names. But one official report soon after the earthquake estimated that up to 10,000 students died in the collapse of 7,000 classrooms and dormitory rooms.
Reports emerged in July 2008 that local governments in the province had begun a coordinated campaign to buy the silence of angry parents whose children died during the earthquake. Most parents whose children died took a payment of about $8,800 from the local government and a guarantee of a pension in exchange for silence.
In December 2008, government officials acknowledged in the most definitive report since the earthquake that many school buildings across the country are poorly constructed and that 20 percent of primary schools in one southwestern province may be unsafe….’
The full article is here. And incidentally, a short film about this, called ‘China’s Unnatural Disaster’ has been nominated for an Academy award.
March 8th, 2010 at 11:03 am
[...] Interesting article By Vivianne Check this blog: Extremely interesting article about the chilean earthquake from Governance expert, Daniel Kaufman (… [...]
March 23rd, 2010 at 10:39 am
so sad
March 25th, 2010 at 10:31 pm
Rodolfo Aldea contributed an erudite historical account of the policy evolution in Chile to mitigate earthquake impact as a comment to the spanish version of this article, here in spanish http://thekaufmannpost.net/desastres-naturales-y-deberes-nacionales-el-terremoto-de-chile-en-una-perspectiva-internacional/comment-page-1/#comment-13298
And for anybody interested in going back almost 200 years, when on the 20th of February 1835 the earth also shook violently in the south of Chile, rattling Charles Darwin himself (and resulting on particular insghts from him), see the introduction to this article here http://www.themillions.com/2010/03/country-of-quakes.html
March 26th, 2010 at 3:13 pm
-On the riots and the problem of poverty, recall that the same happened with the blackout in NYC some years ago and at least in Chile people broke into supoermarkets in part to get food and water, in NYC it was all TV, stereo etc
-On modernizing the police force, one thing I believe would be helpful is to remove the police – the carabineros – from the armed forces and put them under civilian authority.
May 5th, 2010 at 10:09 am
Earthquake disasters – in-situ stress measurement in concrete – a component for the geolocation
With the new acousto elasticy sensors of IBJ Technology can be measured for the first time the concrete tension on-line permanently directly. No sensors are needed for the measurement of the stretch. The acousto elasticy effect seizes directly the influence of the concrete tension on the wave velocity of ultrasonic. This speed change of the ultrasonic waves directly in the sensor are measured. The sensors consist of a small measuring body, which is embedded in the concrete. The pressure strength of the sensors is so large, which is practically indestructible them. In practical attempts concrete inspection pieces were completely destroyed. The tension sensors get over this crash without prejudice to and remain in function. The concrete case of application of these new sensors of IBJ Technology for stress measurement in concrete are on-line measuring procedures for building security. The sensors are characterised by their special suitability for the remote monitoring of buildings of all kinds.
The instrumentation use of the acousto elasticy effect makes qualitatively and quantitatively new measuring and safeguards methods possible in buildings and in the mountains. As example of possible applications the monitoring of local tensile states in buildings can be enough over Period to be called. Further new and at the same time economical applications result, like on-line monitoring of the answer spectrum of buildings of any kind in seismically active areas. Already during the building phase measurements are possible in foundations and stakes. Also tunnel-build with high overlays and/or large ground pressure features can so on-line be supervised. The measuring bodies can be brought in already in the phase of the building production, i.e. concreting. Also an additional installation into boreholes (method of the hard inclusion) or the spanning in expansion joints of buildings is possible. Innovative applications know a world-wide disaster net (disasters net).
The availability of means of transport and traffic center (roads, bridges, airports, tunnels) can within seconds be determined on-line. The representation of the destruction takes place with the geo location (Disasters Geolocation).
The activity of relief organizations can be arranged so efficient The administration and authorities of the states receive such an aid to the maintenance of public security. Seismic data describe only the geographical place and the strength. Reliable on-line data are missing for the degree of the destruction. Seismic sensors bring only measured values to acceleration. Data for the degree of the destruction must come objectively from the building (object).
The data necessary for it are determined with acousto elastic sensors by IBJ Technology.
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